Quotas for women on boards have helped firms in France to improve their employment practices, while changing the way boards and shareholders view the previous working experience of women, according to a new study.

According to a team of researchers, the findings up-end old arguments that quotas are unnecessary because boards are already “optimally configured” before the imposition of quotas.

The team—helmed by Magnus Blomkvist of EDHEC business school in France—concluded that, before mandatory minimum numbers for women on boards were introduced in 2011, French companies ran up against “frictions” in recruiting women “which contributed to the underrepresentation of women on corporate boards”.

The Copé-Zimmermann law, backed by Christine Lagarde (pictured) while she was French minister of finance, was introduced in 2011. It mandated French companies to ensure boards were at least 20% women by 2014—and 40% for large companies by 2017. By 2017, female representation was up to 43%.

Opponents at the time of the law’s introduction argued that quotas would harm France’s “meritocracy”, represented government overreach, or would harm board effectiveness by forcing companies to hire underqualified women. Men’s rights groups claimed it was discriminatory.

But the new research sheds light on its value. The study looked at the election of 2,737 French directors from 2007 to 2020 and examined shareholder support for female candidates before and after the introduction of the quota. Despite opposition the European Union has been moving in the same direction as France.

The study assumed that if board director appointments were already “optimal” before the quota, shareholder support for female board members would be lower post-quota.

Attitudes to female candidates

However, the team did not find “negative female voting”. That led to a number of conclusions: underrepresentation of women was not due to “under supply” but to problems with the way companies looked for candidates, and with attitudes towards their experience and qualifications.

The team writes: “Our analysis does not support boards being optimally configured pre-quota. Instead, we find a post-quota increase in shareholder support for female candidates. This suggests the existence of significant pre-quota frictions, which contributed to the underrepresentation of women on corporate boards.”

Supply, therefore, was not the issue. “Instead, we document that the introduction of quotas compelled firms to modify their hiring practices by appointing candidates with characteristics perceived as valuable by shareholders.”

The quota therefore caused shareholders to reevaluate the “credentials” of female candidates.

“Specifically we observe that prior board experience and education from prestigious institutions became more highly regarded for female directors after the quotas were implemented, bringing their perceived value on par with that of male nominees.”

Quotas have been highly contested, and highly politicised.  Those on the right in politics tend to oppose them, those on the left support them as a levelling tool. However, this research shows that the old arguments may not hold and that there are other issues at play: firms must change their recruitment practices and reevaluate the qualifications and experience needed to access boardrooms. Such changes have been long due.