Barry Gamble

Barry Gamble is an experienced private, public company and charity board director, chair of The NED City Debates, and senior adviser to the Non-Executive Directors Association. He has led a private equity MBO, public company IPO, secondary fundraisings, including working with The Takeover Panel, and an AIM de-admission. Through a role as senior adviser at Boudicca Proxy he also has experience of activists, institutions and corporate boards in shareholder engagement and activist scenarios. Alongside board advisory and NED roles he regularly writes and speaks about the challenge of board best practice working with a range of organisations and media outlets. Formerly Editor-at-Large at BoardRoom magazine, the letters columns of the Financial Times have published a number of his views on corporate governance.

Latest Articles by Barry Gamble

  1. uk corporate governance

    27 November, 2023

    Why UK corporate governance needs tightening up

    The LSE’s response to the government’s panicky U-turn on governance regulation is not helpful to NEDs and other stakeholders.
  1. Share listings board

    14 January, 2022

    Are UK corporate governance rules leading to market malaise?

    A recent article argued the UK needs “more directors who understand risk-taking, not virtue signalling” if London is to regain its status.
  1. Team climbing a mountain using collaborative leadership

    18 October, 2021

    A remixed roadmap for the future of board leadership

    A recent report identifies the need for a new governance model that reflects the changing responsibilities of boards and their leaders.
  1. Businessman touching a yellow arrow

    2 June, 2021

    Activists set their sights on underperforming AIM boards

    A new paper suggests that AIM rules should be revised to encourage activism and better protect the interests of minority shareholders.
  1. Share listings board

    12 May, 2021

    Dual-class shares threaten shareholder democracy and good governance

    Despite City enthusiasm for dual-class shares, corporate governance is largely unworkable without equal treatment for all shareholders.
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